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Business Associations
by W. Carter Bates MI"
and Kort D. L. Peterson"
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys developments in Georgia law in the area of
business associations, including corporations, partnerships, limited
liability companies, and joint ventures.' The first portion of this Article
reviews noteworthy published cases addressing issues of first impression
from the Georgia Court of Appeals, the Georgia Supreme Court, federal

district courts of Georgia, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, issued from June 1, 2011 through May 31, 2012. The
second portion of this Article summarizes additional cases of note that
do not involve issues of first impression. The third portion of this Article
discusses relevant legislation passed by both the Georgia House of
Representatives and the Georgia State Senate in the 2012 session of the
Georgia General Assembly and signed by Governor Nathan Deal.

* Partner in the firm of James Bates Brannan Groover LLP, Macon, Georgia.
University of Georgia (B.A., 1979); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law
(J.D., cum laude, 1982); New York University (LL.M., 1983). Member, Mercer Law Review
(1980-1982); Associate Editor (1981-1982). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of James Bates Brannan Groover LLP, Macon, Georgia.
Kennesaw State University (B.S., summa cum laude, 2004); Washington & Lee University
School of Law (J.D., 2007); Georgetown University Law Center (LL.M., 2008). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Georgia business associations law during the prior survey period,
see Paul A. Quir6s et al., BusinessAssociations,Annual Survey ofGeorgiaLaw, 63 MERCER
L. REV. 83 (2011).
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CASES ADDRESSING ISSUES OF FIRST IMPRESSION

A. The Georgia Supreme Court Overrules the Application of the
FiduciaryShield Doctrine
In a case arising from a dispute over a forum selection clause in an
agreement, the Georgia Supreme Court addressed the "fiduciary shield"
doctrine as a matter of first impression.2 Dr. Carol Walker sold
nutritional supplements acquired from Amerireach.com, LLC, d/b/a
AmeriSciences (AmeriSciences). Walker and AmeriSciences formalized
their economic arrangement in an agreement containing a forum
selection clause limiting venue in the case of litigation to state or federal
courts located in the City of Harris, Texas.' For reasons undisclosed by
the court, Walker terminated the agreement in February 2009 and
demanded that AmeriSciences repurchase the unsold merchandise in her
possession 4 pursuant to the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
(O.C.G.A.) section 10-1-415(dXl). 5 Eight days later, AmeriSciences filed
a declaratory judgment action against Walker related to the forum
selection clause in a Harris, Texas state court.
In April of that year, Walker filed a damage suit against AmeriSciences and three of its corporate officers in the State Court of
Gwinnett County for failure to comply with the repurchase requirements
of O.C.G.A. § 10-1-415(dXl). The Texas court issued a final default
judgment in June 2009 ruling that any damage suit for failure to
repurchase was subject to the forum selection clause, that such clause
was enforceable, and that filing of such a suit anywhere other than
Harris, Texas was a breach of contract. The Gwinnett County court then
granted AmeriSciences summary judgment in light ofthe forum selection
clause and the Texas court's ruling, and the court also dismissed the
three corporate officers as defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction
based on the fiduciary shield doctrine.' The Georgia Court of Appeals
reversed the Gwinnett County court, holding that because Walker's suit
was based on a statutory violation and not a claim under the contract
with AmeriSciences, the forum selection clause contained in that

2. Amerireach.com, LLC v. Walker, 290 Ga. 261, 266, 719 S.E.2d 489, 494 (2011).
3. Id. at 261, 719 S.E.2d at 491.
4. Id.
5. O.C.GA. § 10-1-415(dXl) (2009).
6. Arnerireach.com, 290 Ga. at 262, 719 S.E.2d at 491.
7. Id. The fiduciary shield doctrine generally provides that a nonresident individual
cannot be subject to personal jurisdiction based solely on his or her actions as a corporate
officer. Id. at 264, 719 S.E.2d at 493.
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contract did not apply and res judicata did not prevent her suit.' The
court of appeals also held that the Gwinnett County court "had personal
jurisdiction over the individual defendants even though they were
present in Georgia only" as officers of AmeriSciences. 9
Although the court of appeals applied the fiduciary shield doctrine in
two prior decisions, the Georgia Supreme Court pointed out that both
decisions were decided prior to Innovative Clinical& ConsultingServices
v. FirstNational Bank of Ames, Iowa," decided by the supreme court
in October 2005.11 In that case, the court interpreted O.C.G.A. § 9-1091(1),12 the jurisdictional statute on which Walker subsequently
relied, 13 to grant Georgia courts "unlimited authority to exercise
personal jurisdiction over any nonresident who transacts any business
in this State," limited only by the dictates of procedural due process.' 4
The court in Amerireach.com observed that special treatment of fiduciaries-promoted by the fiduciary shield doctrine-conflicts with the
jurisdictional statute's literal language, that the doctrine was not
necessary as a matter of fairness, and overruled the two court of appeals
cases to the extent that they applied the fiduciary shield doctrine,
declining to follow several federal cases that also applied the doctrine. 5
In support of this decision, the supreme court cited Calder v. Jones,"
a United States Supreme Court case that weakened the legal theory
behind the fiduciary shield doctrine. 7 The court stated that even
though the individual defendants in this case were members of an LLC
rather than officers of a corporation, the court's analysis was not
changed.'8 The court then proceeded to hold that the individual
defendants had sufficient contacts with the State of Georgia-and, in fact,
admitted to physical presence in the State-to support the trial court's
jurisdiction over them."

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 262, 719 S.E.2d at 491.
Id.
279 Ga. 672, 620 S.E.2d 352 (2005).
Amerireach.com, 290 Ga. at 265, 719 S.E.2d at 493.
O.C.G-.A § 9-10-91(1) (2007 & Supp. 2012).
Amerireach.corn,290 Ga. at 264-66, 719 S.E.2d at 493-94.
Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., 279 Ga. at 675, 620 S.E.2d at 355.
Arnerireach.corn,290 Ga. at 266, 719 S.E.2d at 494.
465 U.S. 783 (1984).
Amerireach.com, 290 Ga. at 266-67, 719 S.E.2d at 494.
Id. at 268, 719 S.E.2d at 495.
Id. at 269-70, 719 S.E.2d at 496.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 64

B. The Georgia Court of 4ppeals Interprets a Statute Permitting
Corporationsto Limit Minority Shareholders'Access to Books and
Records
In Mannato v. SunTrust Banks, Inc.,2 the Georgia Court of Appeals
held that O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1602(e) 21 abrogated any common law right of
a shareholder owning two percent or less of a corporation's outstanding
stock to inspect corporate books and records.22 Edward Mannato, a
shareholder of SunTrust Banks, Inc. (SunTrust) stock, requested that
SunTrust sue its officers and directors for breach of fiduciary duty
related to the housing market crash. After an investigation, SunTrust's
board of directors refused Mannato's request. Mannato then demanded
access to SunTrust's books and records in his capacity as a SunTrust
shareholder. SunTrust again denied Mannato's request, this time
asserting he was not entitled to inspect SunTrust's books and records
under O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1602(e) and SunTrust's bylaws as he held less
than two percent of SunTrust's outstanding stock. Mannato subsequently sought an injunction to prevent SunTrust from blocking his access to
its books and records, but the trial court granted SunTrust's motion to
dismiss in light of O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1602(e). Mannato appealed, arguing
that he had a common law right to inspect SunTrust's records.23
The court of appeals interpreted O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1602(e), which
provides that a corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws may
limit inspection of certain corporate records for shareholders owning less
than two percent of the corporation's outstanding stock.' Relying on
legislative history, the court concluded that the Georgia General
Assembly intended to supersede any contrary common law right to
inspection of corporate records by enacting O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1602(e).25
Consequently, the court held that O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1602(e) abrogated any
common law right of inspection provided to shareholders owning two
percent or less of a corporation's outstanding
shares and affirmed the
28
trial court's dismissal of the complaint.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

308 Ga. App. 691, 708 S.E.2d 611 (2011).
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1602(e) (2003 & Supp. 2012).
Mannato, 308 Ga. App. at 693, 708 S.E.2d at 613.
Id. at 691-92, 708 SE.2d at 612; see also O.C.GA. § 14-2-1602(e).
Mannato, 308 Ga. App. at 692-93, 708 S.E.2d at 612; O.C.GA. § 14-2-1602(e).
Mannato, 308 Ga. App. at 693, 708 S.E.2d at 612-13.
Id. at 693, 708 S.E.2d at 613.
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C. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Holds
a Dissolved CorporationHas No PrincipalPlace of Business for
Purposes of Diversity Jurisdiction
In a case of first impression for the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit,27 the court held that a dissolved corporation has
no principal place of business for purposes of diversity jurisdiction and
that such a corporation's citizenship is therefore determined with
reference to the state in which it was incorporated." LanLogistics
Corporation (LanLogistics) sold several companies it owned and, in so
doing, breached a contract with Holston Investments, Inc. (Holston), in
which it granted Holston a right of first refusal with respect to the stock
of one of the companies it sold. LanLogistics never gave Holston an
opportunity to exercise its right of first refusal. Holston, a Florida
corporation, sued LanLogistics, a Delaware corporation with its
headquarters in Miami, in federal court, alleging diversity jurisdiction.
By the time Holston filed suit, LanLogistics had dissolved, forfeiting its
authority to conduct business in Florida.29
After the federal district court entered a judgment in favor of Holston,
LanLogistics moved to vacate the judgment for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, arguing that it was a citizen of Florida for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction and therefore could not be sued by Holston, also a
Florida citizen, in federal court under the auspices of diversity jurisdiction.30 In analyzing the jurisdictional claim, the Eleventh Circuit
referred to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1),3 1 which provides for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction that a corporation is a citizen of every state in
which it has been incorporated and also of the state in which it has its
principal place of business."2 The court then examined a circuit split
on the issue of whether a dissolved or inactive corporation has 3a
principal place of business for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
Looking to the United States Supreme Court's admonition in Hertz Corp.
v. Friend34 that simple jurisdictional tests are preferable to complex
ones, 35 the court sided with the United States Court of Appeals for the
27.

Holston Invs., Inc. B.V.I. v. LanLogistics Corp., 677 F.3d 1068 (11th Cir. 2012) (per

curiam).
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 1071.
Id. at 1069-70.
Id. at 1070.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(cXl) (2006).
Holton Invs., 677 F.3d at 1070; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
Holton Invs., 677 F.3d at 1070-71.
130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010).
Id. at 1193-94.
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Third Circuit and held that a dissolved corporation has no principal
place of business for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. 6 The court
explained that this bright-line rule would provide clarity and predictability.37 Because LanLogistics was dissolved by the time the suit was
filed, it had no principal place of business for diversity jurisdiction
purposes and was a citizen only of Delaware. 8 Consequently, the court
had subject matter jurisdiction over the case.39
D. The Georgia Court of Appeals Rules a CorporateCar Dealer's
Market Area for Purposes of the GeorgiaMotor Vehicle Franchise
PracticesAct is Based on the Corporation'sPrincipalPlace of Business
In WMW, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co.,4 the Georgia Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss filed by
WMW, Inc. (WMW), challenging the establishment of a new Honda
dealership in Cumming, Georgia, based on the proposed dealership's
proximity to WMW's Honda service center in Alpharetta, Georgia.4 '
WMW operated Honda Carland, a dealership and service center in
Roswell, Georgia, under a franchise agreement with American Honda
Motor Company, Inc. (Honda). WMW also operated a service center in
Alpharetta, Georgia. In 2010, Honda notified WMW that it intended to
establish a new Honda dealership in Cumming, Georgia, allegedly within
eight miles of WMW's Alpharetta service center.42 WMW objected and
filed a complaint seeking an injunction against Honda and its would-be
franchisee, claiming that the new franchise would violate the Georgia
Motor Vehicle Franchise Practices Act (the Act),43 which, among other
things, allowed an existing franchisee to seek an injunction against the
establishment of a new franchise within such franchisee's "relevant
market area."'
The trial court dismissed WMWs complaint with
prejudice, holding that WMW had no standing. WMW appealed. 5
For the first time, the court of appeals interpreted the anti-encroachment provisions of the Act.' The relevant provisions of the Act require
a franchisor, such as Honda, to give a franchisee notice of its intent to

36. Holton Invs., 677 F.3d at 1071.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.

40. 311 Ga. App. 1, 714 S.E.2d 689 (2011), cert.granted.
41. Id. at 1-2, 714 S.E.2d at 690.
42. Id. at 2-3, 714 S.E.2d at 690-91.
43. O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-620 to -670 (2009 & Supp. 2012).

44. WMW, Inc., 311 Ga. App. at 2, 714 S.E.2d at 690-91; see also O.C.G.A.
45. WMW, Inc., 311 Ga. App. at 2, 714 S.E.2d at 691.
46. Id. at 1, 714 S.E.2d at 690.

§ 10-1-664.
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establish a new franchise within the existing franchisee's relevant
market area, and they also permit the franchisee to petition the
appropriate superior court to enjoin or prohibit the establishment of such
a franchise.4 ' The Act defines "[r]elevant market area" as "the area
The
located within an eight-mile radius of an existing dealership.'
court determined that the location of the dealership in question was
based on the location of the "person" of WMW as a corporation.4 9
Relying on Citizens & Southern Bank v. Taggart, the court ruled
that WMW was located for purposes of the Act where its principal office
or place of business was located: in this case, at WMW's Roswell
dealership, which was more than eight miles away from the proposed
Cumming franchise."' In light of this interpretation of the Act, the
court held that the trial court did not err in concluding that WMW had
52
no standing to challenge the establishment of the Cumming franchise.
Judge Christopher J. McFadden dissented, noting that the majority's
interpretation of the Act arose from a failure to recognize that a
corporation "can occupy more than one place at a time."53
III.

ADDITIONAL CASES OF INTEREST

Where a member of an LLC was not a manager of the LLC but had
the unilateral power to appoint four of the eight managers, the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia held that a
genuine fact dispute existed as to whether the member was a managing
member of the LLC owing a fiduciary duty to the other members.54
This case suggests that a member of an LLC who is not named a
manager may nonetheless be treated as a managing member for
fiduciary duty purposes if such member has functional control over the
management of the entity.
In another case where a member of the board of directors of a bank
and its holding company brought a fraud claim against the bank for
inducing her to invest in the bank's holding company based on misrepresentations about a potential sale of the holding company, her unique

47. O.C.G. § 10-1-664(a)-(b).
48. O.C.G.A. § 10-1-622(13.1).
49. WMW, Inc., 311 Ga. App. at 4,714 S.E.2d at 692 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 10-1-622(13)).
50. 164 Ga. 351, 138 S.E. 898 (1927).
51. WMW, Inc., 311 Ga. App. at 4 & n.1, 714 S.E.2d at 691-92 & n.1.
52. Id. at 5, 714 S.E.2d at 692.
53. Id. at 5, 714 S.E.2d at 693 (McFadden, J., dissenting).
54. Denim N. Am. Holdings, LLC v. Swift Textiles, LLC, 816 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1325-26
(M.D. Ga. 2011).
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access to information about the bank was one factor that led the court
to grant summary judgment to the bank. 55
In a case where a shareholder of a corporation executed a personal
guaranty of the corporation's debt identifying the debtor using only a
later-abandoned fictitious name of the corporation and not the legal
name of the corporation, the court of appeals held that a creditor could
not enforce the shareholder's guarantee of the debt in light of Georgia
courts' preference for strict construction of guaranty agreements.56
Where corporate officers signed a promissory note only once and their
corporate titles appeared with their signatures, the court held that they
signed in a representative
capacity only and did not personally
57
guarantee the note.
IV.

STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS

A. House Bill 945 Authorizes Issuance of Non-Cash Valued Shares by
a Bank or Trust Company and Relaxes Dividend Restrictions
House Bill 945 amends O.C.G.A. §§ 7-1-415'8 and 7-1-46059 to relax
certain requirements with respect to the stock and dividends of banks
and trust companies in the State of Georgia. ° Prior to House Bill 945,
O.C.G.A. § 7-1-415 required banks and trust companies to issue shares
of stock only in exchange for cash, and such cash was required to be at
least equal to the par value of the share.6 ' House Bill 945 permits a
bank or a trust company to issue shares of stock, in a manner that does
not comply with these restrictions, with the approval of the Department
of Banking and Finance after a showing of good cause.62 Thus, banks
and trust companies in Georgia could issue shares of stock in exchange
for capital contributions of property other than cash. Additionally, a
capital contribution of cash could be less than the par value of the stock.
However, any such deviation from prior rules would be subject to the
approval of the Department of Banking and Finance.
Prior to House Bill 945, O.C.G.A. § 7-1-460 provided that Georgia
banks and trust companies could only declare and pay dividends out of

55. Griffin v. State Bank of Cochran, 312 Ga. App. 87, 92, 718 S.E.2d 35, 40 (2011).
56. PlayNation Play Sys., Inc. v. Jackson, 312 Ga. App. 340, 341-42, 718 S.E.2d 568,
569 (2011).
57. Elwell v. Keefe, 312 Ga. App. 393, 396, 718 S.E.2d 587, 590 (2011).
58. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-415 (2004 & Supp. 2012).
59. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-460 (2004).
60. Ga. H.R. Bill 945, Reg. Sess. (2012) (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 7-1-415(a) to -460(a)(1)).
61. O.C.G.. § 7-1-415(a).
62. Ga. H.R. Bill 945 § 1.
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retained earnings." House Bill 945 permits dividends that do not
comply with that restriction if such divide~ids are approved in advance
by the Department of Banking and Finance "on terms consistent with
standards of safety and soundness."'
B.

House Bill 898 Authorizes a New ype of Limited Purpose Bank
House Bill 898, the Georgia Merchant Acquirer Limited Purpose Bank

Act,6 5

provides for the incorporation and control of a new type of

limited purpose bank connected with payment card networks.6 6
Payment card networks include systems designed to allow payment or
acceptance of payment for goods or services using credit or debit
cards.67 Such a merchant acquirer bank must maintain at least $3
million in capital at all times.68 A merchant acquirer bank may not
accept deposits from the general public, but it may apply for deposit
insurance from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.69
C. House Bill 886 Limits Issuance of Credit to Any One Person,
Including Many Business Entities, in a Derivative Transaction
House Bill 886 amends provisions prohibiting a bank from extending
credit to any one person or corporation in excess of certain limitations.7 0 Prior to enactment, O.C.G.A. § 7-1-285(a)71 prohibited a bank
from lending to any one person or corporation, or having obligations
owing to it from any one person or corporation in excess of fifteen
percent of the statutory capital base of the bank, without approval by
the bank's board of directors or a committee authorized by the board to
grant such approval. 72 House Bill 886 clarifies that the phrase
"[pierson or corporation" includes partnerships, associations, joint
ventures, and other entities.7' The Bill also provides that "[huav[ingl
credit exposure as a counterparty in derivative transactions"7 will
count
4
towards the credit limitation found in O.C.G.A. § 7-1-285(a).

63. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-460(aX1).
64. Ga. H.R. Bill 945 § 2.
65. O.C.G.A. §§ 7-9-1 to -13 (Supp. 2012).
66. Ga. H.R. Bill 898, Reg. Sess. (2012) (codified at O.C.GA. §§ 7-9-1 to -13 (Supp.
2012)).
67. Id. § 1.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Ga. H.R. Bill 886, Reg. Sess. (2012) (codified at O.C.GA. § 7-1-285 (Supp. 2012)).
71. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-285 (2004 & Supp. 2012).
72. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-285(a).
73. Ga. H.R. Bill 886 § 1.
74. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION

The most significant judicial development in the area of business
associations this year was the death kiell of the fiduciary shield doctrine
in the State of Georgia. After Amerireach.com, LLC v. Walker, 5
nonresident officers of a corporation and members of an LLC cannot rely
on the corporate or LLC form alone to protect them from suit in
Georgia.7" It will be interesting to see how Georgia courts determine
the extent to which procedural due process limits their authority to
exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents who carry on business
in this state.

75. 290 Ga. 261, 719 S.E.2d 489 (2011).
76. Id. at 265-66, 719 S.E.2d at 493-94.

